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CONFESSIONS AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-
A PROPOSAL
GEORGE NEFF STEVENS*
The time has come to review in the light of United States Supreme
Court decisions the procedures presently employed by state courts in
testing the voluntariness of confessions in criminal cases. If these
procedures be wanting, new procedures should be and must be devised
which will give promise of assuring compliance with the standards
established by these United States Supreme Court decisions.
State courts have adopted different procedures for resolving the
issue of admissibility of a confession under attack as involuntary. The
orthodox rule, which according to Wigmore "is well recognized in the
majority of jurisdictions," states that the admissibility of a confession
is a question for the judge.' However, in recent years, the practice has
spread until today it is followed in a substantial majority of the states
of permitting, authorizing, or requiring the jury to pass on the ad-
missibility of a questioned confession.2 There are several variations
of this practice, but for the purposes of this paper it is not necessary
to examine them in detail.' The vital point, regardless of the variations,
is the fact that the jury hears evidence of and about a confession which
the Supreme Court of the United States concludes was involuntary.
Since the state of Washington is among those which have adopted
"the heresy of leaving the question to the jury" approach, as Wigmore
calls it,4 a review of the procedure in that state will serve to illustrate
and highlight a state court's efforts to deal with this problem of coerced
confessions.
Since territorial days, 1854 to be exact, the statute law of the terri-
tory and later the state of Washington with respect to confessions as
evidence in criminal cases has been as presently set forth in RCW
10.58.030:
* Dean, School of Law, University of Washington.
'3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 861, at 346 (3d ed. 1940).
2 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940) and supplement thereto. Distinguish the
practice, and a worthy one, under which a confession, ruled by the judge to be ad-
missible as voluntary, goes before the jury, along with evidence as to circumstances
surrounding its taking or making, to be accepted or rejected or given such weight as
the jury chooses-i.e., credibility.
3 For an excellent review of the practices in the various states, see in addition to
3 WIaGoRE, op. cit. supra, Professor Bernard D. Meltzer's article, Involuntary Con-fessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHL L. REv.
317 (1954).
4 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 861, at 346 (3d ed. 1940).
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Confession as evidence. The confession of a defendant made under
inducement, with all the circumstances, may be given as evidence
against him, except when made under the influence of fear produced
by threats; but a confession made under inducement is not sufficient to
warrant a conviction without corroborating testimony.
In State v. Washing,' decided in 1904, the Washington Supreme
Court, in construing this statute, held that "usually the admissibility
of evidence is a question for the court to decide as a matter of law"
and that in confession cases, "when it appears to the court that the
admissions or confessions are involuntary, they should be excluded."
The court, quoting a United States Supreme Court case,' added:
When there is a conflict of evidence as to whether the confession is or
is not voluntary, if the court decides that it is admissible, the question
may be left to the jury with direction that they should reject the con-
fession if upon the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the
voluntary act of the defendant.
It is quite apparent that the Washington court placed emphasis on
the words "if the court decides that it is admissible," for it went on
to say7 "We think there was enough in this case to show prima facie
that the statements of the appellant were made voluntarily, and it was
therefore not error to submit the evidence to the jury."
Six years later, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Barker,'
was asked to decide whether it was the duty of the lower court to
determine the voluntary or involuntary nature of the confession under
our statute outside the presence of the jury. The court pointed out that:
Under this statute, when it appears to the court that a confession is
made under the influence of fear produced by threats, of course it is
the duty of the court to exclude the evidence. It is proper for the
court to hear the evidence relating to duress and to decide upon the
admissibility of such evidence, but there is nothing in the statute
requiring such evidence to be taken without the presence of the
jury. If the evidence is clear that no threats were made and that
the admissions were voluntary, it cannot be error for the whole
evidence to be heard by the jury.
The court continued, after referring to an earlier Washington case:
G 36 Wash. 485, 491, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904).6 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896).
736 Wash. 485, 491, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904).
8 56 Wash. 510, 512, 106 Pac. 133 (1910).
0 State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144, 150, 81 Pac. 561 (1905), which held, "The question
whether a defendant is under the influence or fear produced by threats, when he makes
statements imputing guilt of the crime charged against him, is a mixed question of law
and fact . . Y
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But this does not indicate that there must be two examinations of the
witness, one in the presence of the jury and the other without the
presence of the jury. It indicates that the whole examination shall
be made in the presence of the jury. The presiding judge must
decide upon the admissibility of the evidence, and must strike it out
or direct the jury to consider it, according to his conclusion that it is
or is not made under the influence of fear produced by threats. The
conclusion of the trial judge is reviewable upon this question as upon
any other question of law or fact passed upon by the court...zo
In 1912, in State v. Wilson," the Washington Supreme Court held
that "Unless it appeared that the confession was made under the
influence of fear produced by threats, it was the duty of the court to
admit the confession or statement in evidence. Where the evidence is
in conflict upon this point, the question is then for the jury," citing
State v. Washing.12
Jumping over the years to 1944, the Washington Supreme Court in
State v. Van Brunt,"3 with no reference to either State v. Washing or
State v. Barker, held:
An analysis of these [earlier Washington] cases reveals that, where
an issue of fact arises as to the question of the influence of fear
produced by threats and confessions made under inducement, it is
not a question of law for the court to decide, but is a question of fact
for the jury under proper instructions. Where threats or induce-
ments are conceded by the state or where facts are admitted which
as a matter of law constituted threats or inducements, it is a question
of law for the court.
This language would seem to indicate a departure from the approach of
the Washing case, and the rule of the Barker case, which took the posi-
tion that the question of admissibility was for the court, whether or not
the facts giving rise to the question were in dispute.'4
In State v. Meyer, 5 the Washington Supreme Court was faced with
the contention that "under this statute, if a confession is made under
0 In State v. Barker, supra, note 8, the judge heard one witness outside the presence
of the jury, and being satisfied with this testimony, recalled the jury and permitted the
witness to state the confession with all the surrounding circumstances.
"l 68 Wash. 464, 467, 123 Pac. 795 (1912).
"2Supra, n. 5. Later Washington cases are in accord, see, for example, State v.
Clark, 21 Wn2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (194) and State v. Bird, 31 Wn.2d 777, 198 P.2d
978 (1948).
13 22 Wn.2d 103, 107, 154 P.2d 606 (1944).
'- Contrast the language of the Barker case, at page 512 of 56 Wash. "If the evi-
dence is clear that no threats were made and that the admissions were voluntary, it
cannot be error for the whole evidence to be heard by the jury," with the last sentence
above quoted from State v. Van Brunt to the effect that the court can exclude only
when conceded or admitted facts, as a matter of law, show threats or inducements!
is 37 Wn.2d 759, 770-771, 226 P.2d 204 (1951).
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the influence of fear produced by threats, it must not go before the
jury, and whether such is the fact must be determined by the court."
The supreme court pointed out that "authority in support of the
position of the appellants is found in 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.),
342, § 860 and following sections." The court held:
We have decided that it is for the jury to determine whether a con-
fession was obtained under the influence of fear produced by threats.
[Citing earlier Washington cases including both Barker and Van
Brunt, but not Washing.] We pointed out in the Barker case that if
it should appear to the court that a confession was made under the
influence of fear produced by threats, it was its duty to exclude the
evidence, and that it was proper for the court to hear the evidence
relating to duress and decide upon the admissibility of such evidence.
We held that there was nothing in the statute requiring such evidence
to be taken without the presence of the jury and that there need not
be two examinations of the witnesses, one before the court and the other
with the jury present. A situation may arise in the trial of a case
where the court might, in its discretion, make some inquiry in the
absence of the jury with reference to how a confession was obtained,
but the theory of our decisions is that the court is not required by the
statute to do so.
It is rather difficult to reconcile the first two sentences of the above
quotation. By the first sentence, a disputed confession calls for a jury
determination. But, the balance of the paragraph, from the second
sentence on, clearly confirms the power, and duty, of the court to pass
on admissibility, and contains no such restrictions as were set forth in
State v. Van Brunt."
The above series of cases supports the following conclusions with
respect to the Washington procedure for challenging questioned con-
fessions:
First. The trial judge has the power, and the duty, to pass on the
question of admissibility, whether or not the evidence surrounding the
taking of the confession be in dispute.'7
Second. Where there is a conflict of evidence as to whether a con-
fession is or is not voluntary, this question (1) according to one line
of cases may be left to the jury, if the court decides that is is admis-
13 Note the language at page 770 of 37 Wn.2d: "If it should appear to the court."
Certainly it might "appear to the court" on facts other than those admitted or con-
ceded by the prosecution as required by State v. Van Brunt. But, see State v. Winters,
39 Wn.2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951), in which the court sets forth only the first
sentence of the Meyer case and the restrictive language of the Van Brunt decision!
17 State v. Washing, 36 Wash. 485, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904) ; State v. Barker, 56 Wash.
510, 106 Pac. 133 (1910) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951).
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sible, 8 or (2) according to the second line, must be left to the jury. 9
Under either approach the jury is to be instructed to reject the confes-
sion "if upon the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the
voluntary act of the defendant."2
Third. In making his determination, the trial judge may, but need
not, hear the evidence surrounding the taking of the confession outside
the presence of the jury.21
Fourtk. Conversely, in making his determination, the trial judge
may, but need not, hear the evidence surrounding the taking of the
confession in the presence of the jury.2
Fifth. If the trial judge in making his determination hears the
evidence in the presence of the jury, and concludes that it is inadmis-
sible, he must instruct the jury to disregard all that they have heard.
Sixtk. The conclusion of the trial judge that the confession is admis-
sible is reviewable upon this question as upon any other question of
law or fact passed upon by the court. 4
Seventk. The sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding either
by the trial judge25 or the jury" that the confession was freely given
may be challenged.
"I See cases cited in footnote 17.
19 State v. Wilson, 68 Wash. 464, 123 Pac. 795 (1912) ; State v. Van Brunt, 22
Wn.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606 (1944) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951);
State v. Winters, 39 Wn.2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951).
20 State v. Washing, 36 Wash. 485, 491, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904), and see, State v. Van
Brunt, 22 Wn.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606 (1944), and State v. Winters, 39 Wn.2d 545, 548,
236 P.2d 1038 (1951).
21 State v. Barker, 56 Wash. 510, 512-513, 106 Pac. 133 (1910) ; State v. Meyer,
37 Wn.2d 759, 771, 226 P.2d 204 (1951).
22 See cases cited in footnote 21.
23 No Washington cases are directly in point. But see State v. Barker, 56 Wash.
510, 513, 106 Pac. 133 (1910).
24 State v. Barker, 56 Wash. 510, 513, 106 Pac. 133 (1910).
25 State v. Washing, 36 Wash. 485, 491, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904) : 'We think there was
enough in this case to show prima facie that the statements of the appellant were made
voluntarily, and it was therefore not error to submit the evidence to the jury"; State
v. Barker, 56 Wash. 510, 513, 106 Pac. 133 (1910) : "In this case the evidence of the
witness examined without the presence of the jury was ample to show that the con-
fession was not made under duress, but was the voluntary confession of the defendant
made upon two different occasions .... There was, therefore, no error in receiving the
evidence or in determining that it was admissible in the presence of the jury."
26 State v. McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 397, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897), where the court
held, "A person who has been induced by fear to make a confession is not bound by such
confession, and the practice of extorting confessions from persons accused of crime by
confining them in dark cells until a confession is wrung from them, is a practice that
cannot be condemned too strongly. It cannot receive judicial sanction."; State v.
Miller, 61 Wash. 125, 111 Pac. 1053 (1910), wherein the court held inadmissible a con-
fession where the facts showed threats by the prosecuting attorney of a series of prose-
cutions unless he confessed, subjection to solitary confinement in a dark cell, and brutal
treatment by police, in spite of jury's verdict of guilty. The philosophy behind the
outlawing of coerced confessions is well put by the court at pages 129-130 of 61 Wash.;
State v. Miller, 68 Wash. 239, 122 Pac. 1066 (1912), holding that error in admission
of a confession induced by threats of prosecution, imprisonment in a dark cell, personal
[VoL. 34
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The Washington practice with respect to questioned confessions was
challenged and found wanting in Cranor v. Gonzales," which arose
out of a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington, Southern Division, wherein
petitioner sought (and, as it turned out, successfully) to secure his
release from custody under judgment of conviction for murder in the
Washington courts, on the ground that the confession admitted in
evidence at his state trial was obtained as a result of physical violence
and threats of further physical violence."
Because of this decision, the Washington Judicial Council was re-
quested to look into the confession procedure problem. Early in 1958
it made a recommendation which the Washington Supreme Court
adopted and put into effect, in January 1959, as follows:
violence by police, is not cured by evidence of a second confession made four days
later, but while still in custody. The court points out that the accused was denied per-
mission to communicate with his attorney, in violation of what is now RCW 9.33.020.
Oppression Under Color of Office. Every officer, or person pretending to
be such, who unlawfully and maliciously, under pretense or color of official
authority shall... (5) No officer or person having the custody and control
of the body or liberty of any person under arrest, shall refuse permission to
such arrested person to communicate with his friends or with an attorney, nor
subject any person under arrest to any form of personal violence, intimidation,
indignity or threats for the purpose of extorting from such person incrim-
inating statements or a confession. Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
And, at page 245 of 68 Wash. "The confession was procured in direct violation of this
statute.. ."; State v. Harvey, 145 Wash. 161, 259 Pac. 21 (1927) holding that a con-
fession was coerced where the accused were told they would be locked up until they
were willing to talk and that unless they confessed they would be prosecuted on a series
of charges.
But, compare these earlier cases, which are worthy of serious attention, with State
v. Van Brunt, 22 Wn.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606 (1944). The undisputed facts in this case,
see pages 106, 107 of 22 Wn.2d, show "solitary confinement for three days and nights
; .. , with the electric lights burning so that he could not sleep; being called a liar;
assurances of the Sheriff's friendship and help if he would sign the confession; and,
generally speaking, what might be termed an overreaching of the defendant." Yet the
court held, at page 108 of 22 Wn.2d, "In the case at bar, the jury held against
appellant's contentions as to threats and inducements, and it was within their province
to do so." It is not clear from the opinion how the court knew how the jury had
decided this particular issue. All that the record shows is a judgment on a general
verdict of guilty. And see, State v. Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 55, 173 Pac. 721 (1918),
where the court said, with respect to the issue of coercion in obtaining a confession,
"It being at best a disputed question of fact, the verdict of the jury concluded appellant
to pursue the question further.. .", which was quoted, with italics, in Van Brunt
These later cases are illustrative of why procedures such as that employed in Wash-
ington are under attack in the Federal Courts.27 226 F.2d 83, 94 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 935 (1956) : "The evidence,
sufficient to convince the judge that Gonzales had in fact been beaten in the course of
coercion of a confession, when considered in the light of the inherently unsatisfactory
character of the State court proceedings, warranted the exercise of the court's discre-
tion to hear the case and determine the constitutional issue."
28 For an excellent review of this case and the issues see Hendel, Habeas Corpus-
Jurisdiction of a Federal District Court with Respect to State Prisoners, 31 WAsHr.
L. REV. 304 (1956). For an excellent discussion of the general problem, see Beverly,
Federal-State Conflicts in the Field of Habeas Corpus, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 483 (1953).
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Rule 101.20W. Confession Procedure.
(1) Where the circumstances surrounding the taking of a confes-
sion are placed in issue either at the time of trial or prior thereto,
the trial judge shall be the trier of the question of admissibility.
(2) If the defendant testifies at the hearing on this matter, the
fact that he so testifies shall not be mentioned to the jury, nor shall
it waive any of the rights of the defendant.
(3) If an objection is made to the admissibility of the confession,
such objection is not waived by any offer of evidence or cross-examina-
tion with respect to the confession point during the trial.29
Does this rule solve the problem? Is it an adequate confession pro-
cedure?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to discover what
the United States Supreme Court has had to say about procedures
under which the jury hears evidence as to the voluntariness of con-
fessions.
In 1896, in Wilson v. United States,"0 the court said: "When there
is a conflict of evidence as to whether a confession is or is not volun-
tary, if the court decides that it is admissible, the question may be left
to the jury with the direction that they should reject the confession if
upon the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the voluntary act
of the defendant."
In 1924, in Wan v. United States,"' the Court pointed out: "The un-
disputed facts showed that compulsion was applied. As to that matter
there was no issue upon which the jury could properly have been
required or permitted to pass."
In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi,2 the Court stated:
Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter.
The State is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance
with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." . . . The State may abolish
trial by jury. It may dispense with indictment by a grand jury and
substitute complaint or information ... But the freedom of the State
in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government
and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Because a
State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may
substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be
substituted for the witness stand. The State may not permit an
29 WASH. RULES, PLEADING, PRACTICE, PRoCEDURE 101.20V.
30 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896).
"1266 U.S. 1, 16 (1924).
32297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
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accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination-where
the whole proceeding is but a mask-without supplying corrective
process....
In 1951, in United States v. Carignan,3 the Court held:
The United States concedes . . . that the better practice, when
admissibility of a confession is in issue, is for the judge to hear a
defendant's offered testimony in the absence of the jury as to the
surrounding facts .... We think it clear that this defendant was entitled
to such an opportunity to testify....
The evidence on the new trial will determine the necessity for or
character of instructions to the jury on the weight to be accorded the
confession, if it is admitted in evidence...
In 1953, in Stein v. New York, 4 the Supreme Court said:
At pages 159-160:
The trial court heard evidence in the presence of the jury as to the
issue of coercion and left determination of the question to the jury.
Petitioners claim that such use of these confessions creates a con-
stitutional infirmity which requires this Court to set aside the con-
viction.
At page 170:
In the setting of these facts, the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners involve procedural features not heretofore adjudicated by
this Court....
At page 172:
The procedure adopted by New York for excluding coerced confes-
sions relies heavily on the jury. It requires a preliminary hearing as
to admissibility, but does not permit the judge to make a final determ-
ination that a confession is admissible. He may-indeed, must-
exclude any confession if he is convinced that it was not freely made or
that a verdict that it was so made would be against the weight of
evidence. But, while he may thus cast the die against the prosecution,
he cannot do so against the accused. If the voluntariness issue presents
a fair question of fact, he must receive the confession and leave to the
jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination of its
voluntary character and also its truthfulness. . . . The judge is not
required to exclude the jury while he hears evidence as to voluntari-
ness,... and perhaps is not permitted to do so,... [Citing New York
cases].
33 342 U.S. 36, 38, 39 (1951). This case arose in the territory of Alaska.
34 346 U.S. 156 (1953), at pages indicated in the text.
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At page 177:
Petitioners suffer a disadvantage inseparable from the issues they
raise in that this procedure does not produce any definite, open and
separate decision of the confession issue.... If the method of submis-
sion is, as we believe, constitutional, it leaves us to review hypothetical
alternatives.
This method of trying the coercion issue to a jury is not informative
as to its disposition....
At pages 178-179:
But this inability of a reviewing court to see what the jury has
really done is inherent in jury trial of any two or more issues . . .
The uncertainty, while the cause of concern and dissatisfaction in the
literature of the profession, does not render the customary jury practice
unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid jury trial of the issue.
The states are free to allocate functions as between judge and jury as
they see fit. . . [D]espite the difficult problems raised by such jury
trial, we will not strike down as unconstitutional procedures so long
established and widely approved by state judiciaries, regardless of our
personal opinion as to their wisdom.
Accordingly, it is clear that state procedures which permit the jury
to hear and to pass upon evidence as to the voluntariness of confessions
are not, as such, in violation of the United States Constitution. The
converse is equally clear. The United States Constitution does not
require a jury trial in state courts on the issue of admissibility of a
questioned confession. And it follows that even a state constitutional
provision requiring a jury trial of this issue, if there were one, would
not free the state court's decision of United States Supreme Court
supervision, since a right protected by the United States Constitution
is involved.
These conclusions become even more apparent upon examination
of yet another side of the problem, and that is the effect of jury con-
sideration of a coerced confession. The United States Supreme Court,
in dealing with state cases involving confessions, has ruled, time and
again, that the admission in evidence over objection of a confession,
found by the Court to be involuntary, vitiates a judgment of convic-
tion. The reason for this is that the use in a state criminal case of a
defendant's confession obtained by coercion, whether physical or
mental, is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution."
35 See, for example, Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896); Wan v.
[Vor.34
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Even more important from the standpoint of the practicality of the
procedure under review, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that if the confession is found by it, the Supreme Court, to be involun-
tary, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the
evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient to
sustain the jury's verdict of guilty." The reason behind this rule is
that a conviction in a case where the jury has heard evidence concern-
ing a confession, which the United States Supreme Court finds was
coerced, regardless of how the jury may have dealt with it, constitutes
a deprivation of liberty without due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution."
Thus, while the procedure under consideration is constitutional, its
use will result in a reversal unless the United States Supreme Court
finds the confession voluntary."8 It follows that the accused has no
right to a trial by jury on the issue of admissibility of a questioned
confession. Also, it suggests that for all practical purposes, the re-
sponsibility for screening confessions must be placed in the judge, and
he must make his investigation in the absence of the jury.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court, above discussed,
are predicated on the power and duty of the Court to make its own
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287(1936) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 154 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ; Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953) ; Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 179, 182, 184, 187 (1953) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558
(1954); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
60, 561 and n. 1 on pages 561-562 (1958) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321
(1959).
A' Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n. 1 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 404 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) ; Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-568 (1958) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959).
The United States Supreme Court has held that Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953) is not contra; see, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 n. 15 (1958) and
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959).
37 See cases cited in footnote 35, particularly Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475-
"The mere admission of the confessions by the trial judge constituted a use of them
by the state, and if the confessions were improperly obtained, such a use constitutes a
denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Contrast
the majority approach with the dissent in Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 557, 586
(1954) ; and see, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) and Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959). Inherent in this decision is the fear that the jury, or at least
some of the jurors, will not abide by the court's instructions. Mr. Justice Jackson put
it well in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949), "The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, . .
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
3S See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) : "Stein held only that when
a confession is not found by this Court to be involuntary, this Court will not reverse
on the ground that the jury might have found it involuntary and might have relied
on it."
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decision as to whether a confession was voluntary or coerced. This
power and duty have been explicitly enunciated," or quite obviously
assumed, 0 in case after case involving questioned confessions, whether
the facts surrounding the confession were disputed4' or undisputed."'
The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that in
39 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 148 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) ; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) ; Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) ; Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 (1959).
40 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
184, 186, 188 (1953) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
41 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941) : "[Where the evidence is con-
flicting], we accept the determination of the triers of fact, unless it is so lacking in
support in the evidence that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness
which is at war with due process."; the dissents in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607,
615, 621, 624 (1948), point out that the facts surrounding the confession were in dispute
and argue that since the procedure employed by the Ohio court is not criticized by
this Court, the decision of the trial judge and jury acting under proper instructions
should be accepted, but they were not! ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-52 (1949)-
"On review here of State convictions, all those matters which are usually termed issues
of fact are for conclusive determination by the State courts and are not open for re-
consideration by this Court... .' But "issue of fact" is a coat of many colors. "It does
not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion
incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are
decisive of constitutional rights... there has been complete agreement that any con-
flict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court's
concern. Such conflict comes here authoratively resolved by the State's adjudication.
Therefore only those elements of the events and circumstances in which a confession
was involved that are unquestioned in the State's version of what happened are relevant
to the constitutional issue here. But if force has been applied, this Court does not leave
to local determination whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture
of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force. . ." ; Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952)-"In the present case, however, we need not
confine ourselves to the undisputed facts; for, even if we give petitioner the benefit of
every doubt as to the alleged coercion, we do not think it can fairly be said that his
confession . . .was coercion's product."; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953):
"[A] United States court appraises the alleged abuses by the facts as shown at the
hearing or admitted on the record."; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 168-170 (1953) ;
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) : "This question can only be answered by
reviewing the circumstances surrounding the confessions. We therefore examine the
circumstances as shown by the undisputed facts of the case,"-which seems a bit con-
tradictory! The dissent points out that the evidence was conflicting and adds, at p.
586, "It does not seem to me a denial of due process for the State to allow the jury to
say, under all the facts and circumstances in evidence and under proper instructions
by the court, whether the subsequent confessions were tainted or were free and vol-
untary," but the majority obviously disagreed, even as to whether the facts were in
dispute; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958), for although the facts were
apparently undisputed, the Court said "The question for our decision then is whether
the confession was coerced. That question can be answered only by reviewing the
circumstances under which the confession was made. We therefore proceed to examine
those circumstances as shown by this record"; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316
(1959), for, again, while facts were apparently not in dispute, the Court's language is
broad, "We cannot escape the respo ]Fibility of making our own examination of the
record."
42 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 154 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) : Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) ; Strob v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) : Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475-476 (1951) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156. 166 (1953);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954).
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making its own examination of the record to determine whether the
claim is meritorious, the performance of this duty cannot be, and is
not, foreclosed by the findings of a court or the verdict of a jury, or
both.43
Thus, a change in procedure, alone, is not enough. There must be
a sympathetic understanding of the judicial philosophy behind this
series of cases. This philosophy was clearly enunciated in Spano v.
New York:"
This is another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether
a confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As in all such cases, we are forced to resolve a conflict
between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt
and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights
of its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional
methods of law enforcement....
And
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on
43 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237, supra n. 40 (1941) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 599 (1948) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953): "[O]ur review
penetrates its [the Court of Appeal's] judgment and searches the record in the trial
court," and at 180-182, "At the threshold of our inquiry, therefore, lies the question:
What, if any, weight do we give to the verdict of the jury, the rulings of the trial
judge and the determination of the state appellate court? . . . Of course, this Court
cannot allow itself to be completely bound by state court determination of any issue
essential to decision of a claim of federal right, else federal law could be frustrated by
distorted fact finding. But that does not mean that we give no weight to the decision
below, or approach the record de novo or with the latitude of choice open to some state
appellate courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals. ... It is common courtroom
knowledge that extortion of confessions by 'third-degree' methods is charged falsely
as well as denied falsely. The practical problem is to separate the true from the false.
Primarily, and in most cases final, responsibility for determining contested facts rests,
and must rest, upon state trial and appellate courts.... When the issue has been fairly
tried and reviewed, and there is no indication that constitutional standards of judgment
have been disregarded, we will accord to the state's own decision great and, in the
absence of impeachment by conceded facts, decisive respect . . .. " The Court then
proceeded to weigh the evidence and reach its own conclusions, at page 184 as to
physical violence, and 186 as to psychological coercion! Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 561-562 (1958), "Enforcement of the criminal laws of the States rests principally
with the state courts, and generally their findings of fact, fairly made upon substantial
and conflicting testimony as to the circumstances producing the contested confession-
as distinguished from inadequately supported findings or conclusions drawn from un-
controverted happenings-are not this Court's concern; yet where the claim is that
the prisoner's confession is the product of coercion we are bound to make our own
examination of the record to determine whether the claim is meritorious. 'The per-
formance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by the finding of a court, or the verdict of
a jury, or both.' The question for our decision then is whether the confession was
coerced. That question can be answered only by reviewing the circumstances under
which the confession was made. We therefore proceed to examine those circumstances
as shown by this record."
44360 U.S. 315, 315, 320-321 (1959) ; see and compare Washington cases cited in
footnote 26.
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the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforc-
ing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves. Accordingly, the actions of
police in obtaining confessions have come under scrutiny in long series
of cases. Those cases suggest that in recent years law enforcement
officials have become increasingly aware of the burden which they
share, along with out courts, in protecting fundamental rights of our
citizenry, including that portion of our citizenry suspected of crime.
The facts of no case recently in this Court have quite approached the
brutal beatings in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), or the
36 consecutive hours of questioning present in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143 (1944). But as law enforcement officers become more
responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more sophis-
ticated, our duty to enforce federal constitution protections does not
cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more delicate
judgments to be made....
Whether they like it or not (and very few will disagree on principle,
although some will complain that it adds to the work of police and
prosecutor), police officials,45 prosecuting or district attorneys," and
judges of state courts at all levels47 must face up to the necessity of
meeting and complying with the standards set by the United States
Supreme Court with respect to confessions or face reversal of convic-
tions where confessions, involuntary in the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, were submitted to the jury. The kinds of conduct
which, alone or in combination, make confessions involuntary are in-
dicated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For
convenience of police officials, prosecuting or district attorneys, and
judges of state courts at all levels, some of these fact patterns are set
forth in the footnote hereto."
45 See, for example, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-601 (1948).
46 See, for example, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, especially at 285 (1936);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405, 406-407 (1945). Canon 5, all too frequently
overlooked, is quite explicit: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prose-
cution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible." Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association; RCW
2.48.230; WASH. Rtmzs, CANONS, PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 5.
4T See, for example, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285, 287 (1936). Canons
of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3, Constitutional Obligations: "It is the duty of all judges
in the United States to support the federal Constitution and that of the state whose
laws they administer; in so doing, they should fearlessly observe and apply funda-
mental limitations and guarantees." American Bar Association; WASH. RuLEs,
CANONS, JUDIcIAL ETHIcs 3.4 8 F act patterns which have been held to make confessions involuntary and there-
fore inadmissible:
1) Seven days of interrogation. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
2) Brutality and violence by police. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
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In order to measure up to this responsibility, state trial and supreme
court judges must re-evaluate the worth and legality of their decisions
and the constitutionality of state statutes, if any, pertaining to the
admissibility of confessions. For example, it should by now be quite
apparent that the Washington statute on Confessions as Evidence,
RCW 10.58.030, which is set forth in full above, is unconstitutional,
as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
3) Held incommunicado for 36 hours, under constant questioning by relays
of police officers, without sleep or rest. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944).
4) Held incommunicado without being arraigned for several days, intermittent
questioning, not permitted to see his lawyer, misconduct of prosecutor.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
5) Fifteen year old boy questioned in relays from midnight until he confessed
at 5:00 A.M., held three days thereafter incommunicado. Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
6) Held without arraignment, without aid of counsel or friends for six days,
at times in solitary confinement, no bed or chairs, with interrogation by
relays of police, usually late at night. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949).
7) Long hours of questioning, day and night, followed by trickery through
misuse of a state-employed psychiatrist. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954).
8) Twenty-seven year old, uneducated negro of low mentality, held incom-
municado, without preliminary hearing, without advice of counsel or
friends, with intermittent questioning by police for several hours at a time
over a ten day period. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
9) Slow, mentally dull, arrested without a warrant, held incommunicado for
over forty-eight hours in spite of requests to see him, not fed regularly,
threatened with a lynch mob. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
10) Foreign born, junior high education, record of emotional instability, lead-
ing questions by relay of five lawyers and police, for over eight hours
without let up during evening and night, denial of request for counsel in
the face of known instructions of counsel to keep quiet, and abuse of friend-
ship with a police officer. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). With
respect to the denial of a request to contact counsel as a ground for hold-
ing a confession inadmissible, four judges in Spano stressed that this factor,
alone, should be sufficient. However, the majority of the Supreme Court
held to the contrary in a case in which this contention was directly before
the Court-Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). And see, Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
11) With respect to delay in arraignment as a ground for holding state con-
fessions inadmissible, note the following: Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 404 (1945). The New York court instructed the jury that "although
the delay in arraignment was not conclusive, they might consider it in
passing on question of voluntariness"; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476
(1953)-"If the delay in the arraignment of petitioner was greater than
that which might be tolerated in a federal criminal proceeding, due process
was not violated"; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953), after
stating that illegal detention for three or four days alone does not make a
confession inadmissible, pointed out--"To delay arraignment, meanwhile
holding the suspect incommunicado, facilitates and usually accompanies
use of 'third-degree' methods. Therefore, we regard such occurrences as
relevant circumstantial evidence in the inquiry as to physical or psycho-
logical coercion"; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, n. 2 on p. 194 (1957) :
"Under the cases of that State [Alabama], violation of this requirement
[prompt arraignment] does not render inadmissible a confession secured
during such detention. . . . Nevertheless, such an occurrence is 'relevant
circumstantial evidence in the inquiry as to physical or psychological
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to the United States Constitution, in so far as it purports to authorize
the admission in evidence of any confession of a defendant, made
under inducement, with all the circumstances, except when made
under the influence of fear produced by threats." The exception is
much too narrow. From Wilson to Spano, as has been demonstrated,
the United States Supreme Court has held consistently that confes-
coercion.... ." And see, in concurring opinion, at p. 199, n. 1: "But it is
to disregard experience not to recognize that the ordinary motive for such
extended failure to arraign is not unrelated to the purpose of extracting
confessions." It is suggested that this line of cases indicates that the
United States Supreme Court is going to take a very careful look at the
surrounding facts where confessions follow a delay in arraignment.
Fact patterns where confessions were held voluntary and therefore admissible:
1) Failure to arraign promptly, detention over forty-eight hours. Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
2) Presence of nineteen police officers, no force or threats of force, some
evidence of a kick by a police officer during search at time of arrest hours
earlier. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
3) Held without arraignment for eighteen days, no physical brutality, no
prolonged questioning, proper warnings as to his right to counsel and to
remain silent. Brown v. Allen, 344 U,S. 443 (1953).
4) Illegal detention for three or four days, no physical brutality found, twelve
hours of intermittent questioning by several different officers over a thirty-
two hour period, with proper opportunity to sleep and eat. Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
5) A 31 year old college graduate who had attended law school for one year
and studied criminal law, during fourteen hours of intermittent question-
ing between arrest and confession had asked for but was denied a request
to consult with counsel on several occasions, was told of his right not to
answer and had refused to answer many questions and to take a lie detector
test, was given coffee, milk and sandwiches and was permitted to smoke.
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
49 An example of a decision which requires reevaluation on the basis of its reason-
ing and in its strict application of the Washington statute is State v. Winters, 39 Wn.2d
545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951). In this case the confession had been attacked as involun-
tary because of delay in arraignment. The Washington Supreme Court stated, at page
549 of 39 Wn.2d, that "Threats which do not produce fear will not eliminate considera-
tion of the confession." (Emphasis is the Court's). And, at pages 249-250, "There is
no constitutional or statutory provision in the state of Washington having to do with
the use of confessions as evidence against the defendant in a criminal trial, except...
[RCW 10.58.0301. Under the purview of the statute it was not error to admit the
confession." Defendant had tried to raise the federal due process question, but his
choice of United States Supreme Court cases -was such that the Court, and quite
properly so, found them not in point. In fact, they support the Washington Supreme
Court's position that the rule they announce is predicated on a rule of -procedure. See
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 -(1943) ; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948); Mallory v. United -States,. 354 U.S. 449" (1957). The decision in the
Washington case, as distingnished from its reasoning, is, perhaps, still the law. But
see discussion of the United- States Supreme- Court- cases on the prompt arraignment
problem herein in footnote 47, paragraph-11, and note an increasing concern on the
part of the United States Supreme Court with.violations of this particular state law
by state police officials. Thus; -while the Washington Supreme- Court was "right" on
the facts of this case at that time, its-approach to- the problem invites review by appeal
to the United States -Supreme Codrt or by habeas corpus proceedings in Federal
District Courts, because the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court does not
guarantee a full and careful -couisideration by the court of -the -accused's -federal con-
stitutional rights with respect to the admissibility of confessions which are not the
result of fear produced by threats.
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sions "are inadmissible if made under any threat, promise, or encour-
agement of any hope or favor," if they are the result of the accused's
will having been "overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy
falsely aroused," or, to summarize, if the facts show either physical
or psychological coercion." The "influence of fear produced by
threats" category of the Washington statute is but one of many types
of coerced confessions which have been held to be inadmissible. State
officials would do well to be guided by the test set forth in Wilson v.
United States:"' "In short, the true test of admissibility is that the
confession is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or
inducement of any sort."
Reverting to the conclusions set forth above with respect to the
Washington confession picture, these United States Supreme Court
decisions made it quite clear that:
The First conclusion is sound, both legally and practically-the trial
judge has the power, and the duty, to pass on the question of admissi-
bility, whether or not the evidence surrounding the taking of the con-
fession be in dispute.
The Second conclusion, both parts (a) and (b), is impractical, if not
unconstitutional, and should be abandoned-in the conflict of evidence
situation. The jury simply cannot be exposed to testimony about what
may turn out to be a coerced confession.
The Third conclusion must be altered by eliminating the alternative.
A practical rule of procedure must require the trial judge to hear the
evidence of the confession outside the presence of the jury.
The Fourth conclusion must be abandoned. The trial judge must
not hear the evidence in the presence of the jury, for reasons above set
forth.
The Filth conclusion will not satisfy the United States Supreme
Court. The jury simply must not hear any testimony about a coerced
confession; if they do, an instruction will not cure the error; only a
new trial will correct this fatal mistake.
The Sixth conclusion stands-the conclusion of the trial judge that
the confession is admissible is reviewable upon this question as upon
any other question. of law or fact passed upon by the court.
The Seventh conclusion remains as an accurate statement of the
law-that the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding either
50 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) ; Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 323 (1959) ; and cases cited in footnote 47.
51 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896).
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by the trial judge or the jury that the confession was freely given may
be challenged. But, a good procedure should eliminate this problem
in so far as the jury is concerned by leaving to the jury only the ques-
tion of the weight and credibility which they wish to give to a con-
fession found admissible by the court.
Rule 101.20W-Confession Procedure, above set forth, complies
with these conclusions in so far as, in subsection (1), it makes the
trial judge the trier of the question of admissibility, but it is not clear,
in subsection (3), as to what the jury's responsibility is with respect
to a confession questioned at the trial. Nor does subsection (2) deal
effectively with the problems raised by the possible desire of the de-
fendant to take the stand on the coercion issue at the hearing before
the judge or at the trial.
What, then, should be the procedure used in state courts to pass
upon the admissibility of a confession? It is submitted that the fol-
lowing rule, for the reasons indicated, would meet both constitutional
requirements and practical considerations.
PROPosED RULE-CONFESSION PROCEDURE
(1) In every criminal case in which a confession or confessions of the
accused are to be offered in evidence, the judge, either at the time of the
trial or prior thereto, shall hold a hearing, in the absence of the jury, for
the purpose of determining whether, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, the confession was voluntary, and, therefore admissible.
A court reporter shall record the evidence adduced at this hearing.
Comment: The trial judge must realize that on him, and him alone, rests
the expensive and far-reaching consequences of an erronous decision
admitting in evidence a coerced confession. The jury cannot save him. His
error can be corrected only by a new trial. Because of his mistake, a
dangerous person who might well have been convicted on other evidence
in the case, or available through additional investigation, might be turned
loose on society. At best, society must bear the costs of a new trial. If he
must err, the trial judge should err in favor of strict application of the
philosophy behind the rejection of coerced confessions. While the responsi-
bility for decision rests in the judge, the prosecuting or district attorney,
in the light of Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, has a grave
responsibility in this matter. It is his responsibility to decide in the first
instance whether a confession should be offered in evidence. This decision
must be made on the basis of the law of the land and with the realization
that "good" advocacy might, where the facts in the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court do not warrant it, lead in the long-run to reversal.
The proposal that all confessions be examined is included in order to
prevent or at least make extremely unlikely a successful cry, years later,
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when the facts are pretty hard to ascertain, that the confession was
coerced.
2
The need for the presence of a court reporter will become apparent in
section 3 of this proposal.
(2) It shall be the duty of the trial judge to inform the defendant that:
(a) he may, but need not, testify at the hearing on the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession; (b) if he does testify at the hearing, he will be
subject to cross-examination with respect to the circumstances surrounding
the taking of the confession and with respect to his credibility for purposes
of impeachment as a witness; (c) even though he does testify at the
hearing, he does not by so testifying waive his right to remain silent during
the trial; and (d) if he does so testify at the hearing, neither this fact nor
his testimony at the hearing shall be mentioned to the jury unless he takes
the witness stand on the confession issue during the trial.
Comment: Since the issue at the hearing is the admissibility of the
confession, the defendant should be given the opportunity to testify with
respect to the surrounding circumstances without subjecting himself to
cross-examination on the facts of the crime with which he is charged, and
without waiving his right not to take the stand at the trial. However, if he
does decide to testify at the hearing his testimony on the point at issue
should be subject to impeachment. "Certainly the Constitution does not
prohibit tests of credibility which American law uniformly applies to
witnesses. '53
(3) After the hearing the trial judge shall set forth in writing (a) the
undisputed facts; (b) the disputed facts; (c) his conclusions as to the dis-
puted facts; (d) his conclusion as to whether the confession was voluntary
and admissible, or involuntary and inadmissible, with reasons in either
case.
Comment: The objective is to assure a careful consideration of the facts
and of the law by the trial judge.54 These findings of fact and conclusions
of law will, when properly prepared, prevent unnecessary appeals and
r2 An interesting example of this possibility was reported in the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, July 22, 1959, p. 21, col. 5. It involved a habeas corpus proceeding in
the federal district court, resulting in an order by a Federal District Judge, that a
prisoner, one Geither Horn, who had served 23/ years under a state conviction be
released, on the ground that his confession had been coerced. The petitioner said he
had been taken at night from the County Jail to the edge of an open grave and told,
in effect, that he would be buried alive if he didn't confess. Three police officers denied
this. They said Horn had been taken out of jail one night "to visit the scene of the
crime." The Federal District Judge evidently decided to believe the petitioner. A
proper procedure should require such issues, present or potential, to be resolved when
the facts are fresh-not five, ten or twenty-five years later.
l3 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 175 (1953).
54 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) and its dissents make it quite clear that the
solution to the problem of admissibility of confessions does not lie in procedure alone,
but only in the intelligent use of an adequate procedure by a trial judge who thoroughly
understands and applies the United States Supreme Court's philosophy on admissi-
bility of confessions. This includes, as pointed out above, a reevaluation of state
statutes and case law on admissibility of confessions. And see footnote 48.
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reduce applications for habeas corpus on the one hand,5 5 and will facilitate
correction by appeal where error is apparent on the other.
(4) If the trial judge rules that the confession is admissible, and it is
offered in evidence: (a) the defense may offer evidence, or cross-examine
the witnesses, with respect to the circumstances surrounding the confession,
without waiving an objection to the admissibility of the confession; (b) no
reference shall be made to the fact, if it be so, that the defendant testified
at the preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the confession, unless the
defendant takes the witness stand on the confession issue at the trial; (c)
if the defendant takes the witness stand on this issue, he shall be subject
to cross-examination to the same extent as would any other witness; and
(d) if the defense raises the issue of voluntariness under (a) above, the
jury shall be instructed that they may give such weight and credibility to the
confession, in view of the surrounding circumstances, as they see fit.
Comment: If the defense wants jury consideration of the facts surround-
ing the confession for purposes of weighing or testing its credibility, this
rule permits it, without waiver of an objection, if any, as to the question
of admissibility.56 Furthermore, since under this procedure, the jury's
concern is with weight and credibility, and not admissibility, no problem
arises out of the fact that, under a general verdict, it is impossible to tell
how the jury treated the confession issue."
The rule also covers the controversial question of the right of a
defendant to take the witness stand in a criminal case on this specific
issue without subjecting himself to unlimited cross-examination. This
proposal takes the position that the accused if he wishes to become a
witness at the trial should be treated as any other witness during the
trial. The United States Supreme Court has had this problem before
it on at least two occasions. In Fikes" the Court refused to pass on a
question raised because of the refusal of the trial judge to permit
petitioner to testify concerning the confession without subjecting him-
5 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953) : "Although they have the power,
it is not necessary for federal courts to hold hearings on the merits, facts or law a
second time [as was done in Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955)] when
satisfied that federal constitutional rights have been protected."56 It should be quite apparent from the discussion of the United States Supreme
Court cases on the effect of jury consideration of confessions, found by the U.S.
Supreme Court to be coerced, that the defendant has no right to a jury trial concerning
the admissibility of a confession challenged as involuntary. However, he should have
the right to have the jury weigh the credibility of the confession in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, if he wishes. See, United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36
(1951), wherein the second issue was "a failure of the trial court to submit to the
jury, as a question of fact, the voluntary or involuntary character of the confession,"
and the Court held, at page 39, "The evidence on the new trial will determine the
necessity for or character of instructions to the jury on the weight to be accorded the
confession, if it is admitted in evidence. . ." (Emphasis added).
5 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) : "Stein held only that when a
confession is not found by this Court to be involuntary, this Court will not reverse on
the ground that the jury might have found it involuntary and might have relied on it."
t8 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 192 (1957).
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self to unlimited cross-examination as to the facts of the crime charged,
since the Court found the confession coerced and reversed on that
ground. The same question, however, was raised and discussed in
Stein." "An attack on the fairness of New York procedure is that
petitioners could not take the witness stand to support, with their own
oaths, the charges their counsel made against the state police without
becoming subject to general cross-examination . . ." The Court, in
discussing this point, said: "It is not impossible that cross-examination
could be employed so as to work a denial of due process."6 Then, the
court pointed out, at page 175, "If they had given such testimony, it
would have been in direct conflict with that of the police, and the de-
cision would depend on which was believable. Certainly the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit tests of credibility which American law uniformly
applies to witnesses. . . ." And, at page 177, "The Constitution safe-
guards the right of a defendant to remain silent; it does not assure
him that he may remain silent and still enjoy the advantages that
might have resulted from testifying."
This makes sense. The rights of the accused are adequately pro-
tected by the proposed preliminary hearing procedures. If he wishes
to testify at the trial, he should be treated the same as any other wit-
ness, for under this procedure the issue on the confession during the
trial is weight and credibility, not admissibility.
GO Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 174, 177 (1953).
60 Id. at 174.
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